The Infantries Accuracy

As a result, armies seldom moved more than five days march from the beef up cities and frequently stayed within the fortifications during struggles. Campaigns thus centered around these fortifications and sieges were putting surface (especially since sieges rarely involved pitched battles) (Palmer 94-95).

The political realities of most of the ordinal Century also affected how wars were fought. There was little fellowship between the rulers and the ruled in Europe at that time. nationalism and nationalism were weak concepts and the common people did not readily identify themselves as citizens of a particular unsophisticated. A politics demanded little of its people besides taxes and loyalty; in wartime, it essay to limit damage to civilian interests. This was a reaction to the ghostlike wars of the previous century, when much of Europe was devastated by virtually unfathomable warfare (Palmer 92).

The soldiers who comprised most of the European armies did not come from a "cross-section" of the citizenry in the modern sense. Instead, they were professionals who fought for a living. umpteen were undesirables who did not fit in to civilian society; others were external mercenaries, fighting for whoever paid them. They were not motivated by patriotism or nationalism; their loyalties lay largely with their units and their leaders. The resulting weak trammel between the soldi

As a result of all these factors, the wars fought by Frederick were not wars of annihilation, where one country sought to bangly subjugate another. Although battles were brutal, they rarely resulted in the complete terminal of one of the armies. Similarly, battles were not fought to force a riotous victory in a war; rather, campaigns were conducted with the intention of forcing an opposite into conceding victory (Duffy, 12-13; Keegan 344-45; Palmer, 103; Weigley, The Age of Battles 193-95).

ers and the state meant that commanders had to be cautious of desertions during campaigns and had to ensure that supplies were always available (Palmer 92-93).

Napoleon's style of warfare stage set the stage for the unlimited wars of the ordinal Century.

The nationalism which gripped France immediately succeeding(a) the Revolution spread throughout Europe and, eventually, the rest of the world. every country raised the largest army it could during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries and soldiering became a part of citizenship. Most theorists envisioned war as total, unlimited in aims and scope.

In contrast to Mahan, Corbett ne'er developed a theory emphasizing the primacy of sea indicator and its family relationship to overall national power. Instead, he focused upon maritime strategy and the purpose of naval warfare. Maritime strategy consisted of the principles which governed the relationship between naval warfare and overall war. Naval strategy accomplished the goals established by maritime strategy. Command of the sea was not an absolute, as it was for Mahan. Rather, it was securing the right of passage on the sea. The destruction of the enemy fleet was not necessarily the prime design of one's fleet; destruction of enemy commerce and protection of one's take in was the prime object. Thus, sea warfare could be limited in its scope if the overall objects of a war were also limited. ocean warfare was an extension of land warfare (Gooch 38-44).

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